New Deals: An absentee-run organic dry cleaner, mobile vet diagnostics business, and 3 other finds...

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NEW DEALS

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📍 Location: Pennsylvania
💰 Asking Price: 1,500,000
💼 EBITDA: $462,732
📊 Revenue: $1,192,928
📅 Established: 1946

💭 My 2 Cents: Dry cleaning is a shrinking industry, and that's the pitch. The demand isn't disappearing, it's concentrating: the number of US dry cleaners fell roughly 12% in the two years after COVID, on top of a slow bleed running since 2001, and every closure sends a neighborhood of weekly customers to whichever cleaner is left standing. This one has been standing since 1946, runs owner-absentee, and feeds 3 drop stores in wealthy neighborhoods from a central plant. The quiet advantage is the solvent. The plant runs hydrocarbon machines on organic DF 2000, already clear of perchloroethylene, the older solvent that contaminates soil and groundwater and drags cleanup rules behind it for decades. That also makes the footprint hard to copy, since permitting a new solvent plant takes years of zoning and environmental review. But running clean today says nothing about the last 80 years, so a Phase II environmental assessment comes before anything else. The obvious question is who actually runs the plant, so ask it and lock that person up. Beyond that I'd want the split between counter retail and any wholesale accounts, how much volume runs through each of the 3 stores, and the age and remaining life on the boiler and both washers, since a single failure idles the plant and all 3 stores at once. The building is for sale on top of a lease that runs to 2036, and in this industry that's not a real estate decision, it's a liability decision: buying the building means buying the dirt underneath it, so let the Phase II results choose for you.

📍 Location: Massachusetts
💰 Asking Price: $2,750,000
💼 EBITDA: $633,000
📊 Revenue: $1,454,000
📅 Established: N/A

💭 My 2 Cents: Plumbing is one of the few home services no one can put off, since a burst pipe or a dead water heater forces the call whatever the budget. This company spent nearly 20 years becoming the top-rated plumber in its market, and the owner has already stepped off the tools into a shop role while a crew of about 5 plus a dedicated service technician handles the work. It runs on reputation (just $7,500 a year in advertising), and Massachusetts is specific about what holds it together: the plumbing business license must name a master plumber of record who sits as an officer or manager of the company, so identifying that person and keeping them past closing decides whether the deal works at all. The best part of the revenue is the paid membership program of annual inspections and priority emergency response, the recurring base most trades never build because it turns emergency callers into customers on a schedule. I'd want the installation-versus-service mix, and how much of the commercial push is booked versus hoped for. The seller says service demand outruns capacity, which means growth is already sitting in the phone queue: ask how they've recruited plumbers to date and whether they run apprentices, because every licensed hire converts turned-away calls straight into revenue. The quiet asset is sitting in the name: the excavation capability means this shop can dig and replace the sewer and water lines most plumbers have to hand off, so the largest jobs in the trade stay in house from first call to backfill.

📍 Location: Florida
💰 Asking Price: $1,575,000
💼 EBITDA: $550,000
📊 Revenue: $2,600,000
📅 Established: 2011

💭 My 2 Cents: Home care sits in front of the clearest demographic wave in small business: the oldest of the 73 million baby boomers turn 80 in 2026, most would rather stay home than move into a facility, and every payer from the VA to Medicaid would rather fund the cheaper option too. This agency has ridden that for 15 years on caregivers and an office team of coordinators and administrators. The payer mix is the headline: 67% self-pay, where the agency sets its own rates, and 33% veterans, where the VA never misses a check but sets the price. The self-pay side carries the margin, the VA side supplies demand that doesn't depend on a family's savings holding out, and neither can sink the book alone. Caregiver supply is the binding constraint here, not demand, so what a buyer takes on is a recruiting engine for aides in a market where every agency fishes the same pond. I'd want caregiver turnover against the weekly hours booked (a staffing gap is a canceled shift and a lost client), the average length of stay on service (since the book only holds flat if new clients arrive on schedule), and how much of the growth has come from new clients versus more hours on the same ones. While a fresh Florida home care license is cheap, the referral pipeline is not, and the veterans' benefits coordinators and hospital discharge planners who send families here on reflex are the real asset under the asking price.

📍 Location: California
💰 Asking Price: $2,208,104
💼 EBITDA: $507,324
📊 Revenue: $1,130,191
📅 Established: 40+ years ago

💭 My 2 Cents: A lathe is the machine other machines depend on. It spins a block of metal against a fixed cutting tool to carve the round parts, the shafts, bushings, and threaded pieces, that nearly everything mechanical is built around, which is why a builder that has put thousands of them into the field across 40+ years owns something no new competitor can buy at any price: an installed base that comes back for parts, service, and the next machine. What makes that base hard to pry loose is standardization, since a plant that trained its people on these lathes, stocked the spares, and built tooling around them buys the replacement from the company that already knows them rather than eat the switching cost. The catch is the shop itself, 1 full-time and 1 part-time employee, so the first thing I'd map is how much of the build and design lives in the owner's head versus on paper, because if the answer is his head, the real negotiation is over how long he stays, not the price. I'd also want the split between new-machine sales and recurring parts and service, and the concentration across the largest accounts, since a niche base can hide a few customers carrying the whole book. The upside is the aftermarket: thousands of machines in the field wear out parts and need service on their own schedule, which is likely more demand than 1 full-time and 1 part-time employee can serve. A buyer who staffs for it may be capturing revenue the founder has been turning away for years.

📍 Location: Indiana
💰 Asking Price: $2,520,000
💼 EBITDA: $810,000
📊 Revenue: $1,080,000
📅 Established: N/A

💭 My 2 Cents: Most vet clinics can take the image but not read it at a specialist level, because the specialists barely exist: fewer than 1,000 board-certified veterinary radiologists serve the entire US, so practices refer imaging out as a matter of routine. This company is that referral in its market, running mobile ultrasound at the practice and reading radiology remotely. The revenue repeats because a practice that trusts one imaging partner routes every case its way rather than reshopping each scan, and repeat use and referrals drive most bookings with almost no marketing. The scarce input is credentialed imaging hands, and that is the whole risk, because the seller is one of the producers (staff is 1 full-timer, 1 part-timer, 3 contractors) stepping back from a workload the business already runs at capacity to meet. The recruiting plan is the first diligence item, since the seller says growth is gated by staffing not demand, so a buyer either brings clinical credentials or has qualified imaging people signed before day one. I'd also separate the profit between the on-site ultrasound (hands-on scanning that stays defensible) and the remote reads (where software is starting to encroach on interpretation), and rerun the earnings with a hired producer's salary in the cost line before pricing anything. The scarcity cuts both ways, though: the same shortage that gates this company's growth stops anyone from spinning up a competitor against it, so the buyer who solves the hiring problem owns a market that stays hard to enter for everyone else.