New Deals: A contract-backed Hawaii tour operator, two massage franchise locations with managers, and 3 other finds...

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NEW DEALS

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📍 Location: Hawaii
💰 Asking Price: $2,800,000
💼 EBITDA: $762,620
📊 Revenue: $2,271,000
📅 Established: 1980s

💭 My 2 Cents: This operator's bookings come from contracts rather than tourists walking up to a kiosk. What that means is when arrivals to Kauai soften, the downside is protected, because a guest who booked through the resort desk paid before they ever landed, while a walk-up sale needs somebody with an open afternoon to decide on the spot. That likely means resort concierge agreements where the desk sells your tour for a cut, destination management companies feeding weddings and incentive trips, or wholesaler allotments where a Costco Travel or Japanese inbound operator commits to seats months out. The business also comes with $565,000 of equipment and more on order, which at that number is probably a fleet of outfitted 4x4s and vans or a couple of vessels with trailers and safety gear, and either way saltwater and red dirt are eating it on a 5-7 year replacement cycle (so make sure you're allocating $80,000 to $110,000 a year to capex). Partner-fed revenue is more concentrated than foot traffic, so I'd also ask for revenue by channel over three years, what commission each partner takes off the top, and what survives if the largest one walks at renewal. Kauai is also running against the state trend, adding visitors and spending while statewide arrivals drift down, and oddly enough, length of stay is falling fast, down 13.4% in May. Shorter trips mean visitors show up with a fixed list already booked, which pushes more of the island's spending through exactly the channels this business sits inside.

📍 Location: Missouri
💰 Asking Price: $3,000,000
💼 EBITDA: $621,000
📊 Revenue: $3,418,000
📅 Established: N/A

💭 My 2 Cents: What separates this from the average massage place is that it sells memberships instead of one-off visits, across two locations sitting in shopping centers with foot traffic built into the site. Members pay monthly whether they book a session or not, which smooths out the week-to-week swings that hit walk-in competitors, and managers already run both stores day to day. At $3.4M across two units these are running comfortably above typical unit volumes in this category, so the operator clearly knows what they're doing. That said, between royalties and marketing fees roughly a tenth of revenue is gone before rent or payroll, and you don't get to raise prices to cover it, because the franchisor sets the membership program and franchisees have to run it to spec. Meanwhile therapist wages are set by the Missouri labor market, so what you can actually control is therapist productivity, add-on attach rates, and retail sold per visit. Licensed therapists are the scarce input here, not customers, which makes turnover and time-to-hire at each location the first thing I'd check, followed by cancellation and freeze rates, because a membership model can read as recurring while churning hard underneath. I'd also want the accrued unused session balance, since members bank sessions they've already paid for and you inherit the obligation to deliver them, plus whether there's any open territory left nearby. Two units is the awkward middle of franchising, where you carry a system operator's royalty load and brand standards without enough locations to spread a recruiter or a regional manager across them, so the real question is whether this is a platform that can reach five.

📍 Location: Illinois
💰 Asking Price: 1,200,000
💼 EBITDA: $720,000
📊 Revenue: $800,000
📅 Established: 2024

💭 My 2 Cents: Non-emergency medical transport, the trips that get dialysis patients and Medicaid enrollees to appointments they'd otherwise miss, exists because Medicaid is federally required to cover transportation to and from medical care. What that mandate guarantees is the demand, not the price. States pay a broker to run the benefit, and the broker subcontracts operators like this one, sets the rate, and keeps the spread, so Medicaid trips fill the vans while being the worst-paying work on the schedule. VA, managed care, and private pay all pay better for the same van and the same driver, which is why this company having all four channels jumped out at me. The business comes with four vans and four people, three of them contractors, and a manager handling daily operations who's willing to stay. The cash flow and revenue figures presented don't reconcile, so I'd first want to dig into the P&L, broken out by payer with driver pay, fuel, and insurance on their own lines. Then the trip mix, because dialysis runs three times a week on standing orders and behaves like an annuity while one-off appointment trips churn constantly, and those two revenue streams deserve very different multiples. I’d also look into the rate sheet by payer and the on-time performance scorecards, since brokers hand out volume based on on-time performance rather than awarding contracts you get to hold. The Lovell Federal Health Care Center sits next door in North Chicago, so the VA channel here is likely a function of geography, and geography doesn't leave with the owner.

📍 Location: New Jersey
💰 Asking Price: $3,000,000
💼 EBITDA: $800,000
📊 Revenue: $1,900,000
📅 Established: 2009

💭 My 2 Cents: This business supplies orthopedic bracing and durable medical equipment to patients referred by more than 4,000 providers across New Jersey, and it's sitting on top of a federal moratorium where in February 2026 Medicare stopped enrolling new medical supply companies nationwide. The freeze cuts in this business's favor, because a clean supplier number billing continuously since 2009 is now something nobody else can go out and obtain. What it does change is structure. An asset purchase would need a new supplier number and that door is shut, so this is a stock deal, and buying the stock means buying the entity's Medicare history with it. Orthopedic bracing has been one of the most heavily audited categories in the program for years, so I'd want the audit history, whether any location sits on prepayment review, any open overpayment demands, and current accreditation and revalidation status. I'd also dig into which billing codes and which payers the revenue actually runs through. Then how concentrated those 4,000 referrers really are, since a dozen high-volume orthopedic groups behaves nothing like a broad base (though referral relationships built on fitting patients in-office and clearing the paperwork tend to outlast whoever owns the company). Notice what all of this does to the buyer pool. It has to be a stock purchase, the buyer has to clear Medicare screening, and anyone unwilling to underwrite an audit tail is out. That's a far shorter list of bidders than a $3M business would normally attract, and it's the best leverage you'd bring to the price conversation.

📍 Location: Oregon
💰 Asking Price: $4,000,000
💼 EBITDA: $860,396
📊 Revenue: $5,302,998
📅 Established: 2019

💭 My 2 Cents: Falk has been building gear drives and couplings in Milwaukee since 1893, and the brand now sits inside Regal Rexnord's portfolio, sold through authorized distributors rather than direct. This business is one of those distributors, so it manufactures nothing. A drive installed in 1978 is still turning somewhere in a quarry or a paper mill, and when it finally goes the original model has been discontinued for decades, so somebody has to work out which current product still fits and have it on the shelf that day. That's what customers are paying for, and it isn't in a catalog. There's a manager plus four staff running the business, and the owner built the book after a previous employer liquidated, buying key inventory and customer data out of the wreckage. So I'd want to know whether the owner is the commercial relationship or the technical brain, because those hand off very differently. I'd also ask whether the Regal Rexnord authorization is territory-exclusive or shared with other authorized distributors, and on what notice it can be pulled, since these agreements typically run at will. On inventory, aggregate turns tell you nothing, because holding parts that sit for years is the entire service. What matters is part-number detail separating stock a customer will eventually need from stock nobody will ever ask for, and inventory acquired out of a liquidation rather than chosen for these customers deserves a hard look. The national distributors have been rolling up independents like this for years, which tells you both what an exit looks like and who's coming for the same accounts.